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ABSTRACT
Computationalapproaches to discourse understanding
have a two-part goal: (1) to identify those aspects of
discourse understanding that require process-based
accounts, and (2) to characterize the processes and data
structures they involve. To date, in the area of
reference, process-based accounts have been developed
for subsequent reference via anaphoric pronouns and
reference via definite descriptors. In this paper, I
propose and argue for a process-based account of
subsequent reference via deictic expressions. A
significant feature of this account is that it attributes
distinct mental reality to units of text often called
discourse segments, a reality that is distinct from
that of the entities described therein.
1. INTRODUCTION
There seem to be at least two constructs that most
current theories of discourse understanding have
adopted in at least some form. The first is the
discourse entity, first introduced by Lauri
Kartumen in 1976 (under the name "discourse
referent") [9] and employed (under various other
names) by many researchers, including myself [18].
The other is the discourse segment.
Discourse entities provide these theories with a
uniform way of explaining what it is that noun
phrases (NP) and pronouns in a discourse refer to.
Some NPs evoke a new discourse entity in the
listener's evolving model of the discourse (which I
have called simply a discourse model), others refer
to ones that are already there. Such entities may
correspond to something in the outside world, but
they do not have to. To avoid confusion with a sense
of "referring in the outside world, I will use the

terms refer, here, meaning "refer in a model", and
referent,, for the entity in the model picked out
by the linguistic expression.
The basic features of a discourse entity are that (a) it
is a constant within the current disco&se model .&d
that (b) one can attribute to it, inter alia,properties
and relationships with other entities. (It is for this
reason that Bill Woods once called them "conceptual
coat hooks".) In some theories, different parts of the
discourse model (often called spaces) may represent
different modalities, including hypothetical contexts,
quantified contexts, the belief contexts of different
agents, etc. Depending on what space is currently
being described, the same NP or pronoun may evoke
and/or refer, to very different discourse entities.
The other common construct is the discourse
segment. While discourse segmentation is generally
taken to be a chunking of a linguistic text into
sequences of related clauses or sentences, James Allen
notes:

... there is little consensus on what the segments of
a particular discourse should be or how
segmentation could be accomplished. One reason
for this lack of consensus is that there is no precise
definition of what a segment is beyond the
intuition that certain sentences naturally group
together [[I], p. 398-91
What is taken to unify a segment is different in
different theories: for example, among computational
linguists, Grosz & Sidner [5] take a discourse
segment to be a chunk of text that expresses a
common purpose (what they have called a discourse
segment purpose) with respect to the speaker's
plans; Hobbs 181 takes a discourse segment to be a
chunk of text that has a common meaning; while
Nakhimovsky [12], considering only narrative, takes
a discourse segment to be a chunk of text that
describes a single event from a single perspective.

S j +1
Figure 1. Discourse Segm entation
[2] and Rachel Reichman [ 151) have discussed
problems inherent in this discourse parsing task,
While discourse segment is usually defined
among which is the lack of precise definition of its
recursively, theories differ in what they take the
basic
building block.
minimal segment to be. Hobbs takes it to be a
sentence, and Polanyi [12], a clause. Grosz &
For the current discussion, the most significant thing
Sidner do not state explicitly how much is needed to
about these two constructs is their different
express a single purpose, but from their examples, it
associations: discourse entities go with NPs (to
appears to be a single sentence as well. (Unlike
explain anaphoric and definite referenca and
Hobbs and Polanyi, Grosz & Sidner do not consider
discourse segments go with sentences or clauses
every sentence to be a discourse segment per se.)
(to explain textual coherence and discourse structure).
Since discourse segment is defined recursively, the
This leaves a gap in the case of reference, to what
resulting segmentation of a text (or at least, large
can only be taken to be some aspect of a sequence of
parts of it) can be described as a tree. From the point
clauses, sentences or utterances (e.g., its content,
of view of processing, this means that at any point in
form, modality, etc.), for example:
the discourse, several segments, each embedded in the
one higher, may still be open - i.e., under
construction. This is illustrated schematically in
Example 1
Figure 1.
It's always been presumed that when the
At the point of processing sentence Sj+l in this
glaciers receded, the area got very hot. The
example, segments DSkl, D S u l i , ..., D S u l j are
Folsum men couldn't adapt, and they died out.
That's what is supposed to have happened. It's
complete (closed - indicated by a *), while DSk,
the textbook dogma. But it's wrong. They were
D S u , and DSu1 are open, able to incorporate
human and smart. They adapted their weapons
sentence Sj+l (or, alternatively, its corresponding
and
culture, and they survived.
unary discourse segment). Of special interest is the
right frontier of the tree -- the set of nodes
Example 2
comprising the most recent closed segment and all
currently open segments -- here {DSulj,D S u l ,
The tools come from the development of new
D S u , and DSk), which I will make use of later in
types of computing devices. Just as we
Section 3. Several researchers (including Grosz &
thought of intelligence in terms of
Sidner 151, Hirschberg & Litman [6], Robin Cohen

servomechanism in the 1950s, and in terms of
sequential computers in the sixties and
seventies, we are now beginning to think in
terms of parallel computers, in which tens of
thousands of processors work together. This
is not a deep, philosophical shift, but it is of
great practical importance, since it is now
possible to study large emergent systems
experimentally. [[6] p. 1761
The obvious question is whether such referencem
involves the same processes used to explain how a
pronoun or NP evokes and/or refers, to a discourse
entity or whether some other sort of process is
involved. In this paper I will argue for the latter,
giving evidence for a separate reference, process by
which a linguistic expression is first interpreted as a
pointer to the representation of a discourse
segment and then further constrained to specify
either (a) a particular aspect of the discourse segment
(e.g., its form, interpretation, speech act, etc.) or (b) a
particular entity within its interpretation.
In Section 2, I will attempt to justify the existence
of a second referring, process linked to a
representation of discourse segments per se. In
Section 3, I will attempt to justify particular features
of the proposed process, and Section 4 summarizes
the implications of this work for discourse
understanding.
2. Justifying a Second Referringm Process

There is ample evidence that subsequent reference can
be made to some aspect of a sequence of clauses in
text. Besides Examples 1 and 2 above, several other
examples will be presented later, and the reader should
have no trouble finding more. So the existence of
such a phenomenon is not in dispute. Also not in
dispute is the fact that such subsequent reference is
most often done via deictic pronouns: Of 79 instances
of prominal referencem to clausal material found in
five written texts ,only 14 (-18%) used the pronoun
it while the other 65 (-82%) used either this or that
(17 instances of that and 48 of this). On the other
hand, looking at all instances of pronominal
referencem using it to discourse entities evoked by
NPS*, of 41 such references, 39 (-95%) used it while
only 2 (-5%) used this or that. Because of this, I
will call this type of reference discourse deixis.
The fist thing to note about discourse deixis is that
the referentm is often distinct from the things
described in the sequence. For example,

Example 3
There's two houses you might be interested in:
House A is in Palo Alto. It's got 3 bedrooms and
2 baths, and was built in 1950. It's on a quarter
acre, with a lovely garden, and the owner is asking
$425K. But that's all I know about it.
House B is in Portola Vally. It's got 3 bedrooms,
4 baths and a kidney-shaped pool, and was also
built in 1950. It's on 4 acres of steep wooded
slope, with a view of the mountains. The owner is
asking $600K. I heard all this from a friend, who
saw the house yesterday.
Is that enough information for you to decide
which to look at?
In this passage, that in the second paragraph does not
refer to House A (although all instances of it do):
rather it refers to the description of House A presented
there. Similarly (all) this in the third paragraph does
not refer to House B (although again, all instances of
it do): rather it refers to the description of House B
presented there. That in the fourth paragraph refers to
the descriptions of the two houses taken together.
That in each case it is the given description(s) that
this and that are accessing and not the houses, can
be seen by interleaving the two descriptions,a
technique often used when comparing two items:
Example 4
There's two houses you might be interested in:
House A is in Palo Alto, House B in Portola
Vally. Both were built in 1950, and both have 3
bedrooms. House A has 2 baths, and B, 4. House
B also has a kidney-shaped pool. House A is on
a quarter acre, with a lovely garden, while House B
is on 4 acres of steep wooded slope, with a view
of the mountains.The owner of House A is asking
$425K. The owner of House B is asking $600K.
#That's all I know about House A. #This I heard
from a fiiend, who saw House B before it came on
the market.
Is that enough information for you to decide
which to look at?
Here houses A and B are described together, and the
failure of that and this to refer successfully in the
second paragraph indicates that (a) it is not the houses
being referredm to and (b) the individual descriptions
available for referencem in Example 3 are no longer
available here. One must conclude from this that it is

something associated with the sequences themselves
rather than the discourse entities described therein that
this and that referm to here.
The next thing to note is that the only sequences of
utterances that appear to allow such pronominal
reference, are ones that intuitively constitute a
discourse segment (cf. Section l), as in Example
1 (repeated here) and Example 5:
Example 1
It's always been presumed that [lwhen the glaciers
receded, the area got very hot. The Folsum men
couldn't adapt, and they died out.11 That's what
is supposed to have happened. It's the textbook
dogma. But it's wrong. They were human and
smart. They adapted their weapons and culture, and
they survived.
Example 5

...it should be possible to identify certain
functions as being unnecessary for thought by
studying patients whose cognitive abilities are
unaffected by locally confined damage to the brain.
For example, [lbinocular stereo fusion is known
to take place in a specific area of the cortex near
the back of the head. [2Patients with damage to
this area of the cortex have visual handicaps but
show no obvious impairment in their ability to
think2] This suggests that stereo fusion is not
necessary for thought.11 This is a simple
example, and the conclusion is not surprising....
[[61, P. 1851
In Example 1, that can be taken to refer, to the
narrative of the glaciers and the Folsurn men, which
is intuitively a coherent discourse segment. (Brackets
have been added to indicate discourse segments.
Subscripts allow for embedded segments.) In Example
5, the first this can be taken as referring to the
observation about visual cortex-damaged patients. The
second this can be taken as referring to the whole
embedded "brain damage" example.
To summarize the current claim: in the process of
discourse understanding, a referentm must be
associated with each discourse segment, independent
of the things it describes. Moreover, as Example 6
shows, this referentm must have at least three
properties associated with it: the speech act import of
the segment, the form of the segment, and its
interpretation (e.g., as a situation, event, object
description, etc.)

Example 6
A: Hey, they've promoted Fred to second vice
president.
(* that speech act *)
B 1: That's a lie.
(* that expression *)
B2:: That's a funny way to describe the situation.
(* that event *)
B3: When did that happen?
(* that action *)
Bq: That's a weird thing for them to do.
I have not said anything about whether or not these
discourse segment referentsm should be considered
discourse entities like their NP-evoked counterparts.
This is because I do not believe there is enough
evidence to warrant taking a stand. Part of the
problem is that there is no precise criterion for
"discourse entity-hood? However, if every discourse
segment evokes a discourse entity, an account will be
needed of (1) when in the course of processing a
segment such a thing happens, and (2) what the
'focus' status of each of these entities is.
3. Features of Deictic Referencem

I suggest that the process of resolving discourse
segment reference, involves the following steps:
1. An input pronoun is first interpreted as a pointer
to a representation of a discourse segment on the
right frontier (cf. Section 1).
2. As the rest of the clause containing the pronoun
is interpreted, pronoun interpretation may be
either
a. further constrained to some property of the
discourse segment representation
b. extended to one of the discourse entities within
the interpretation of the segment
3. As a consequence of whether this or that was
used, the listener characterizes the speaker's
"psychological distance" to its referentm as either
"close" or "far away". That is, this well-known
deictic feature of thisjthat is not used in the
referent-fmding process but rather afterwards, in
attributing the speaker's relationship to that
referent,.
In this section, I will try to motivate each of the
proposed steps.

I have already argued that some deictic pronouns must
be interpreted with respect to a discourse segment.
Here I claim that the only discourse segments so
available are ones on the right frontier. My evidence
for this consists of (a) it being true of the 69
clausally-referring instances of this and that found
in the five texts and (b) the oddity of examples like
the following variation of Example 3 where that in
paragraph 3 is intended to referm to the description of
House A.
Example 3'
There's two houses you might be interested in:
House A is in Palo Alto. It's got 3 bedrooms and
2 baths, and was built in 1950. It's on a quarter
acre, with a lovely garden, and the owner is asking
$425K.
House B is in Portola Vally. It's got 3 bedrooms,
4 baths and a kidney-shaped pool, and was also
built in 1950. It's on 4 acres of steep wooded
slope, with a view of the mountains. The owner is
asking $600K.I heard all this from a friend, who
saw the house yesterday. #But that's all I know
about House A?
Is that enough information for you to decide
which to look at?
(Note that this very limited availability of possible
referents, and the ability to coerce referents to any of
their parts which I shall argue for shortly suggests
parallels between this phenomenon and definite NP
and temporal anaphora.)
Because at any time, there may be more than one
discourse segment on the right frontier, part of the
reference resolution process involves identifying
which one is intended. To see this, re-consider the
first part of Example 5.
Example 5

...it should be possible to identify certain
functions as being unnecessary for thought by
studying patients whose cognitive abilities are
unaffected by locally confined damage to the brain.
For example, binocular stereo fusion is known to
take place in a specific area of the cortex near the
back of the head. Patients with damage to this area
of the cortex have visual handicaps but show no
obvious impairment in their ability to think.
This ....
At this point in the discourse, there are several
things that this can be taken as specifying.

Considering just the things associated with clauses
(and just this segment of text, and not what it is
embedded in), this can be taken as specifying either
the segment associated with the previous sentence (as
in the original text - "This suggests that stereo
fusion is not necessary for thought.") or the segment
associated with the description of the whole example "This is only a simple example, and the conclusion
is not surprising..."). The listener's choice depends on
what is compatible with the meaning of the rest of
As with other types of ambiguity,
the senten~e.~
there may be a default (i.e. context-independent)
preference for one particular form of construal over
the others (cf. [3]) but it is easily over-ridden by
context.
This ambiguity as to the intended designatum of a
pointer is very similar to the ambiguity associated
with the more fundamental and historically prior use
of deixis in pointing within a shared spatio-temporal
context, as in the following example:
Example 7
[A and A-Junior are standing in A's art gallery]
A: Someday this will all be yours.

Here this could be interpreted as either the business,
the pictures, or the physical gallery.6 Both Quine
1141 and Miller [lo] have observed in this regard that
all pointing is ambiguous: the intended
demonstratum of a pointing gesture can be any of
the infinite number of points "intersected" by the
gesture or any of the structures encompassing those
points. (Or, one might add, any interpretation of
those structures.) The ambiguity here as to how large
a segment on the right frontier is encompassed by a
this or that is very similar.
(Another feature that Quine and Miller mention, that
will come up later in this discussion, involves
constraints on the demonstratum of a pointing
gesture to being something present in the shared
context or some mulually recognizable reinterpretation of it. The latter is what Quine has
called deferred ostension. It enables one, given
the right audience, to point to the ceiling, with wires
dangling from the center, say "That's off being
cleaned" and effectively refer to the chandelier. Most
examples of deferred ostension, both in spatiotemporal deixis and discourse deixis, are not that
extreme. However, as I will try to show, both these
features -- ambiguity and "required presence" -- are
characteristic of discourse deixis as well.)
Having taken the initial step of interpreting a
pronoun as pointing to the representation of a
discourse segment, the proposed process must then be

able to further coerce [8,11] that interpretation to be
some property of the discourse segment
representation or to some entity within it. Example
6 (above) illustrates the first type of coercion,
Example 8, the latter.
Example 8
A: In the Antarctic autumn, Emperor penguins
migrate to Tasmania.
B1: That's where they wait out the long Antarctic
winter.
(* that place *)
B2: So that's what you're likely to see there in
May.
(* that species of birds *)
B3: That's when it begins to get too cold even for
a penguin.
(* that time *)
The reason for taking discourse segment identification
and coercion as two separate steps in the process is to
accommodate the fact that most instances of this and
that are as the first NP in a ~ l a u s eSince
. ~ the
listener cannot say for sure what they referm to until
more evidence comes in from the rest of the sentence,
a two-stage process allows the first stage of the
process to be done immediately, with the second stage
done as a subsequent constraint satisfaction process.
This would resemble spatio-temporal uses of this
and that, where the listener recognizes the general
pointing gesture, and then tries to figure out the
intended demonstratum based on what the speaker
says about it (and on general heuristics about what
might be worth pointing to).
Notice that this step of further constraining a
pointing gesture also allows for a uniform treatment
of this and do this (that and do that). A preposed
thislthat may be the object of do or of some other
verb, but the listener will not know which, until s/he
reaches the verb itself, as in Example 9. Considering
actions as properties of their respective events, the
listener should be able to coerce that to be some
appropriate facet of the discourse segment (or to some
entity within that segment - as I will discuss next)
that can be said or done.8
Example 9
Gladys told Sam last night that Fred was a
completejerk.
a. Anyway, that's what Fred believes that
Gladys said.
b. Anyway, that's what Fred believes that
Gladys did?

On the other hand, what appears to be an additional
ambiguity in resolving thisithat may not be one at
all. That is, a listener who is asked what a given
thisithat refersm to must describe the representation
that s/he has created. This act of description is subject
to alot of variability. For example, given a segment
in which a statement A is supported by several pieces
of evidence (B,C,D), the listener might just describe
A (the top level of the representation) or slhe might
verbalize the whole representation.
As with anaphoric pronouns, when a deictic pronoun
specifies an NPevoked discourse entity, it must
actually be part of its corresponding discourse
segment interpretation. The interesting thing is that
the same holds for deictic NPs, distinguishing them
from anaphoric definite NPs, which can easily referm
to things associated in some way with an exisiting
entity, as in
Example 10
John and Mary decided to go on a picnic.
While they remembered most things,
they forgot to put the picnic supplies in the
cooler.
So when they got to the park, the beer was
warm.
By contrast, a similar example with a demonstrative
NP sounds definitely odd -Example 11
John and Mary decided to go on a picnic.
While they remembered most things,
they forgot to put the picnic supplies in the
cooler.
#So when they got to the park, that beer was
warm.
Another example illustrates this in another way:
given that both anaphoric reference and deictic
reference are possible in a particular context, an
anaphoric NP and a deictic NP will be interpreted
differently, even if in all other ways the NPs are the
same. The anaphoric NP may refer, to something
asociated with the current focus, while the deictic NP
must point to something already explicitly included
there. For example,

Example 12

a. Some files are superfiles.
b. To screw up some one's directory, look at the
files.
c. If one of them is a superfile, ....
Example 13

a. Some files are superfiles.
b. To screw up some one's directory, look at
those files.
c. They will tell you which of his files is
absolutely vital to him.
In Example 12, the files is anaphoric, specifying
the files in that person's directory, the entity currently
in focus. In Example 13, those files is deictic,
pointing to the files that are superfiles, i.e., to a
discourse entity explicitly in the interpretation of the
just current discourse segment.
Now, nothing in the process so far described
distinguishes this and that. This is because with
respect to discourse segment referencem, it is rarely
the case that the two cannot be used
interchangeably.10 Thus it must be the case that this
"psychological distance" feature of the deictic only
comes into play after the referent, is found. This
does not imply though that this and that cannot
have different effects on the discourse: in Sidner's
1982 theory [17] and in Schuster's theory of reference
to actions and events [16], this and that are also
distinguished by their effect (or lack thereof)on the
discourse focus. This is compatible with it being
a side effect of judging the speaker's "distance" from
the referent,, that the listener's beliefs about their
shared discourse focus are revised.
To summarize, in Section 2, I argued for the
existence of a second referring process associated with
discourse segmentsper se rather than what they
describe. In this section, I have argued for it having
the features of pointing to the representation of a
discourse segment on the right frontier, followed by
further refinement to a property of the segment or an
entity within its interpretation.
Here I want to argue for the proposed process having
one additional feature. I have separated it out because
it is not essential to the above arguments. However,
it does permit an account of the common pattern of
reference illustrated in Examples 1,2,14 and 15.

Example 1

It's always been presumed that when the
glaciers receded, the area got very hot. The
Folsum men couldn't adapt, and they died out.
That's what is supposed to have happened.
It's the textbook dogma. But it's wrong.
They were human and smart. They adapted
their weapons and culture, and they survived.
Example 2

The tools come from the development of new
types of computing devices. Just as we
thought of intelligence in terms of
servomechanism in the 1950s, and in terms
of sequential computers in the sixties and
seventies, we are now beginning to think in
terms of parallel computers, in which tens of
thousands of processors work together. This
is not a deep, philosophical shift, but it is of
great practical importance, since it is now
possible to study large emergent systems
experimentally. [[6], p. 1761
Example 14

I don't think this can be taken seriously either.
It would mean in effect that we had learned
nothing at all from the evaluation, and anyway
we can't afford the resources it would entail.
Example 15

The Texas attorney general said that the
McDonald's announcement represented "a
calculated effort to make the public think that
they were doing this out of the goodness of their
heart when, in fact, they were doing it because of
pressure from our office. miladelphia Inquirer,
13 June 19861
Suppose one assumes that the ability to specify
something via an anaphoric pronoun is a sufficient
criterion for "discourseentity-hood. Then I would
claim that whether or not a discourse segment
referent, is initially created as a discourse entity,
once the speaker has successfully referred to it via
thisfthat, it must now have the status of a discourse
entity since it can be referenced via the anaphoric
pronoun it. l
Note that I do not mean to imply that one cannot
refer deictically to the same thing more than once -one clearly can, for example

Schuster for their helpful comments on many, many
earlier versions of this paper.

Example 16

They wouldn't hear to my giving up my career in
New York. That was where I belonged. That
was where I had to be to do my work. Peter
Taylor, A Summons to Memphis, p.681
Example 17

By this time of course I accepted Holly's doctrine
that our old people must be not merely forgiven
all their injustices and unconscious cruelties in
their roles as parents but that any selfishness on
their parts had actually been required of them if
they were to remain whole human beings and not
become merely guardian robots of the young.
This was something to be remembered, not
forgotten. This was something to be accepted
and even welcomed, not forgotten or forgiven.
But of the (admittedly few) "naturally occurring"
instances of this phenomenon that I have so far
found, the matrix clauses are strongly parallel -comments on the same thing. Moreover, except in
cases such as Example 17, where the second clause
intensifies the predication expressed in the first, the
two clauses could have been presented in either order,
which does not appear to be the case in the deixisanaphor pattern of reference.
4.

SUMMARY

In this paper, I have proposed and argued for a
process-based account of subsequent reference via
deictic expressions. The account depends on
discourse segments having their own mental
reality, distinct from that of the entities described
therein. As such, discourse segments play a direct role
in this theory, as opposed to their indirect role in
explaining, for example, how the referents of definite
NPs are constrained. One consequenceis it becomes
as important to consider the representation of entire
discourse segments and their features as it is to
consider the representation of individual NPs and
clauses.
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the common use of thisithat in first-person
accounts to refer to the outside world.
that is, ignoring all syncategorematic uses of it (as
in "It is possible that John is here")
As I shall argue at the end of Section 3, the ability
to refer to something anaphorically might be a
sufficient, though perhaps not a necessary criterion
for "entity-hood".
If the example were "That's all I know about it",
that would be taken as referring to the description of
House B, not the discourse segment associated with
the clause "I heard all this from a friend, who saw the
house yesterday". (Call this later segment DS-h.)
However, this need not invalidate my claim about the
accessibility of discourse segments since DS-h can be
understood as a parenthetical, which are treated
differently than non-parentheticals in theories of
discourse - cf. [GS85]. While a parenthetical may
itself contain a decitic pointer to a discourse segment
on the right frontier, it doesn't influence the frontier.
Thus that still has the same discourse segments
accessible as it would without the parenthetical.
Another example of discourse deixis from a
parenthetical is this variation of Example 5.

...it should be possible to identify certain
functions as being unnecessary for thought by
studying patients whose cognitive abilities are
unaffected by locally confined damage to the brain.
For example, binocular stereo fusion is known to
take place in a specific area of the cortex near the
back of the head. (This was discovered about 10
years ago). Patients with damage to this area of
the cortex have visual handicaps but show no
obvious impairment in their ability to think.

The five texts are (1) Peter Taylor's novel,
Summons to Memphis, Ballentine Books, 1986
(pp.1-21); (2) W.D. Hillis' essay, "Intelligence as as
Emergent Behavior", Daedalus, Winter 1988, pp.175189; (3) an editorial from The Guardian, 15 December
1987; (4) John Ryle's review of a set of books on
drug use, "Kinds of Control", TLS, 23-29 October
1987, pp.1163-1164; (5) Phil Williams' review of a
set of books on disarmament, "New threats, new
undertainties", TLS, 20-26 November 1987, p. 1270.
All instances of pronominal referencem using it,
this and that were tabulated.

To get further data on this, I ran an informal
"discourse completion" experiment, modelled on the
above lines, presenting a short, multi-sentence text
which I judged as having several segments on the
right frontier at the point of the last sentence. As
above, I asked subjects to complete a next sentence
beginning "That..."

I specifically used written (primarily objective)
expositions rather than spoken texts in order to avoid

"Another legend tells of a great chief who could not
cease from mourning the death of his beloved wife.
Finally the gods offered to take him to visit his wife

<The subject here is legends of the formation of the
Grand Canyon>
<What follows is the second paragraph of the given
text>

so that he could see she was contented in the happy
hunting ground. In exchange, he was to stop grieving
when he returned to the land of the living. That..."
I also asked subjects to paraphrase what they wrote,
to see explicitly what they took that to specify. The
responses I got showed them taking it to specify
either the chiefs action (expressed in the previous,
single sentence segment) or the whole "bargain"
(expressed in the segment comprising both previous
clauses). While this particular experiment was only
informal and suggestive, well-controlled versions
should be able to produce harder results.
Presumably A-Junior will have enough context to
resolve this more precisely, or he will be smart
enough to ask.
Of the 69 clausally-refemng instances of this and
that pronouns, 51 (-70%) were in subject position
in standard SVO clauses (7 instances of that and 44,
of this), 17 played some other role within their
matrix clause, and 1 was a preposed adverbial ("after
that"). Hence -75% were first NPs.
This does not say which of those actions will be
picked out. See [Schus88] for a discussion of the
choice of evendaction referents of pronouns.
It is possible to construct quite acceptable examples
in which a preposed that functions as the object of
both do and some other verb -- for example "Several
universities have made computer science a separate
school. But that is not necessarily what we want or
could even do." The conjunction of two forms usually
means that at some level, both forms are taken as
being the same.
lo That is because with respect to discourse segment
referencem, it is rarely the case that the two cannot be
used interchangeably!
l1 If one assumes that a discourse segment referentm
is also a discourse entity ab ovo, as it were, then this
pattern might simply be interpreted as such an entity
coming into focus as a result of the deictic reference.
As I noted earlier, there is not enough evidence to
argue either way yet, nor is it clear that the two
accounts would have vastly different consequences
anyway.

